DNFSB flags pattern of preventable glovebox fires at Los Alamos lab

A glovebox fire at Los Alamos National Laboratory is not a small equipment problem. It is a fire inside a sealed enclosure used to handle plutonium and other radioactive material, and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board said that at PF-4, most of those gloveboxes still do not have automatic fire suppression.

In its June 26, 2026 resident inspectors’ activity report, the board said inspectors had raised concerns with site management after changes to glovebox operations did not receive a proper fire hazard evaluation. The same report said resident inspectors had observed a pattern of four preventable fire events dated Jan. 13, 2023, Nov. 7, 2023, March 28, 2025 and June 22, 2026. That timeline makes clear the issue was not a one-off mishap but part of a recurring safety problem inside the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility.

For Los Alamos County, the stakes reach beyond the lab’s fence line. PF-4 is the building where plutonium work is concentrated, and a glovebox fire there can threaten workers, interrupt operations, and raise the risk of radioactive contamination spreading if barriers fail. The board’s 2024 review said it had already examined LANL’s glovebox safety program and glovebox glove integrity program for their effectiveness in protecting workers and preventing the spread of radioactive contamination in the Plutonium Facility.

The June 26 report also noted that the acting Associate Technical Director for Field Operations was on site to evaluate resident inspector performance, underscoring how closely the board was watching the lab’s oversight and safety posture. That attention fits a broader concern that the lab’s controls for glovebox work, especially fire hazard evaluations, have not kept pace with the hazards of handling plutonium.

The board’s concern is especially sharp because a glovebox fire can begin during routine work and then become a contamination event if the box is breached or the contents are not quickly contained. Searchlight New Mexico, the Albuquerque Journal and the American Nuclear Society have each described the recent incident as part of a broader pattern of safety-system weaknesses at the plutonium facility.

The sequence of fires, the lack of automatic suppression in most gloveboxes, and the board’s earlier review in April 2024 point to a persistent operational problem at LANL’s most sensitive nuclear facility. For residents of Los Alamos, the central question is whether the lab will finally close the gaps in hazard review, fire protection and contamination control before the next preventable fire tests the system again.