Gas Supply Shocks Push Nations to Reconsider Nuclear Power Post-Fukushima

Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz following the U.S.-Israeli military assault that began on February 28, 2026, disrupted roughly 20 percent of global oil supplies and significant volumes of liquefied natural gas. For energy-importing nations across Asia, which received 84 percent of the oil and 83 percent of the LNG shipped through the Strait in 2024, the supply shock delivered an unmistakable message: decades of dependence on imported fossil fuels had made them acutely fragile. The political consequences have been swift, pulling governments back toward a technology many had renounced after the meltdown at Fukushima Daiichi fifteen years ago.

Several Southeast Asian nations revived mothballed nuclear plans and set ambitious targets, with nearly half of the region potentially able to bring nuclear energy online by the 2030s. Malaysia revived its nuclear program in 2025 and set a 2031 target for bringing atomic energy online. Vietnam went further: five of the eleven members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines, are chasing nuclear, and Vietnam is building two nuclear plants backed by the Russian state corporation Rosatom. Nearly 40 nations, including the United States, Japan, South Korea and China, have joined a global push to triple installed nuclear energy capacity by 2050, and Southeast Asia will account for nearly a fourth of the 157 gigawatts expected from newcomer nuclear nations by mid-century, according to the World Nuclear Association.

"The surge in crude oil prices caused by the escalating conflict has raised the motivation for countries to speed up their nuclear efforts," said Alvie Asuncion-Astronomo of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. "There's more incentive to follow through compared to previous flirtations with nuclear energy," added Amalina Anuar of the ISEAS-Yusof Institute, a Singapore-based think tank.

The urgency is sharpest in Japan, the country that bore Fukushima's full trauma. Prior to the 2011 disaster, Japan operated 54 nuclear reactors that collectively supplied roughly 30 percent of the country's electricity. By 2024, with only 15 reactors in operation out of 33 technically operable ones, nuclear's share had fallen to 8.3 percent. Japan's Seventh Strategic Energy Plan, adopted on February 18, 2025, pledged that nuclear power would supply 20 percent of the country's electricity by 2040, a target analysts have called almost certainly out of reach. Japan also confirmed on March 27 that it was lifting caps on coal power generation, allowing older and less-efficient plants to operate at full capacity for up to a year from April, a blunt short-term fix underscoring the gap between long-term nuclear ambition and immediate supply reality.

Taiwan's reversal was equally striking. The island had closed its last reactor in May 2025 as part of a planned phase-out, yet its energy stockpiles held just several weeks of LNG and several months of coal, leaving it dangerously exposed to any disruption affecting Qatar, its largest LNG supplier. Taipei moved to restart its nuclear plants and in March 2025 its state-owned Chinese Petroleum Company signed an agreement to purchase LNG from Alaska's North Slope borough as part of a broader effort to diversify supply.

Europe, navigating its own LNG shortfall after Russian pipeline gas was cut off following Ukraine, found itself revisiting the same logic. At the 2026 Nuclear Energy Summit, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called the crisis a "stark reminder" of the vulnerabilities created by relying on other regions for oil and gas, and said Europe needed to invest more in nuclear energy alongside renewables as a reliable, affordable source of low-emissions power.

The hard tradeoffs, however, have not disappeared beneath the political momentum. Of Japan's 33 technically operable reactors, 22 have entered decommissioning since 2011. Three reactors have received restart approval but remain offline due to safety upgrades, and others face unresolved obstacles: Tsuruga-2 failed safety standards in July 2024 after the Nuclear Regulation Authority determined an active fault ran beneath the site. Safety costs have made many plants economically unviable. Small modular reactors, widely discussed as a faster path to new capacity, remain years from commercial deployment. The Hormuz crisis accelerated interest in nuclear restarts but the region's short-term response leaned heavily on coal, with South Korea removing its 80 percent operating cap on coal-fired generation and Thailand restarting two decommissioned coal plants, moves that cut across the very climate goals that nuclear was meant to advance.

Around 19 percent of global LNG supply was disrupted by the conflict, pushing Asian spot prices above $20 per million British thermal units and forcing buyers to compete for limited cargoes. The crisis may have done in weeks what years of climate policy could not: shift the political calculus on nuclear across an entire region. Whether governments follow through once prices stabilize, as history suggests they often do not, is the central question hanging over every new commitment made under emergency conditions.

FORMATTED RESPONSE:

Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz following the U.S.-Israeli military assault that began on February 28, 2026, disrupted roughly 20 percent of global oil supplies and significant volumes of liquefied natural gas. For energy-importing nations across Asia, which received 84 percent of the oil and 83 percent of the LNG shipped through the Strait in 2024, the supply shock delivered an unmistakable message: decades of dependence on imported fossil fuels had made them acutely fragile. The political consequences have been swift, pulling governments back toward a technology many had renounced after the meltdown at Fukushima Daiichi fifteen years ago.

Several Southeast Asian nations revived mothballed nuclear plans, with nearly half the region potentially able to bring atomic energy online by the 2030s. Malaysia revived its nuclear program in 2025 and set a 2031 target. Vietnam went further still, beginning construction of two nuclear plants with the Russian state corporation Rosatom. Altogether, five of the eleven members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, including Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, are now chasing nuclear. According to the World Nuclear Association, Southeast Asia will account for nearly a fourth of the 157 gigawatts expected from newcomer nuclear nations by mid-century, as nearly 40 governments worldwide have pledged to triple installed capacity by 2050.

"The surge in crude oil prices caused by the escalating conflict has raised the motivation for countries to speed up their nuclear efforts," said Alvie Asuncion-Astronomo of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. "There's more incentive to follow through compared to previous flirtations with nuclear energy," added Amalina Anuar of the ISEAS-Yusof Institute in Singapore.

The urgency is sharpest in Japan, the country that bore Fukushima's full trauma. Prior to the 2011 disaster, 54 reactors supplied roughly 30 percent of the country's electricity. By 2024, with only 15 reactors in operation out of 33 technically operable, nuclear's share had fallen to 8.3 percent. Japan's Seventh Strategic Energy Plan, adopted on February 18, 2025, pledged that nuclear power would supply 20 percent of electricity by 2040, a target analysts have described as almost certainly out of reach. Japan confirmed on March 27 that it was also lifting caps on coal power generation, allowing older plants to run at full capacity for up to a year from April, a blunt short-term fix that underscores the gap between long-term nuclear ambition and immediate supply reality.

Taiwan's reversal was equally striking. The island had closed its last reactor in May 2025 as part of a planned phase-out, yet its energy stockpiles held just several weeks of LNG and several months of coal, leaving it dangerously exposed to any disruption affecting Qatar, its largest LNG supplier. Taipei moved to restart its nuclear plants and, separately, in March 2025 its state-owned Chinese Petroleum Company signed an agreement to purchase LNG from Alaska's North Slope borough as part of a broader effort to diversify supply.

Europe, navigating its own LNG shortfall after Russian pipeline gas was cut off following the Ukraine invasion, found itself revisiting the same logic. At the 2026 Nuclear Energy Summit, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called the crisis a "stark reminder" of the vulnerabilities created by relying on other regions for oil and gas, and said Europe needed to invest more in nuclear energy alongside renewables.

The hard tradeoffs have not disappeared beneath the political momentum. Of Japan's 33 technically operable reactors, 22 have entered decommissioning since 2011. Tsuruga-2 failed safety standards in July 2024 after the Nuclear Regulation Authority concluded an active fault ran beneath the site. Safety refurbishment costs have rendered many plants economically unviable for operators. Small modular reactors, widely discussed as a faster path to new capacity, remain years from commercial deployment. South Korea removed its 80 percent operating cap on coal-fired generation and Thailand restarted two decommissioned coal plants, moves that cut across the very climate goals nuclear is meant to advance.

With around 19 percent of global LNG supply disrupted and Asian spot prices above $20 per million British thermal units, the Hormuz crisis may have accomplished in weeks what years of climate policy could not: shifting the political calculus on nuclear across an entire region. Whether governments follow through once prices stabilize, as history suggests they often do not, remains the central question hanging over every new atomic commitment made under emergency conditions.