MI5 warns China uses fake recruiters to target sensitive workers

China’s military intelligence services are using fake recruiters and online job ads to hunt for people who can open doors to classified or privileged information, the Five Eyes intelligence partnership warned in a joint bulletin released on 3 June 2026.

The bulletin, issued by ASIO, CSIS, the FBI, MI5 and NZSIS, says operatives pose as online recruiters or consultants tied to fake cover companies outside China and use familiar professional platforms, including LinkedIn, Indeed and Upwork, to reach their targets. The agencies said the campaign is aimed at current and former government and military personnel, along with academics, journalists and freelance writers.

The target is not just classified material. Canadian intelligence said the goal is to collect privileged military, political and economic intelligence that could give China a strategic and tactical advantage over the Five Eyes, and that some targets are pressured to provide “non-public” information. That can include unclassified material on government policy, military strategy, capabilities and installations. The bulletin also says some cases involving the transfer of sensitive information have already led to criminal prosecutions.

For workers in and around government, the warning points to a modern espionage playbook built around normal-looking hiring conversations. A contact on a job site that arrives through a polished profile, a consultant linked to a cover company outside China, or an offer for a foreign policy or defence analyst role can be part of a deliberate approach. MI5’s National Protective Security Authority, which launched in 2023 to replace the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure with an expanded remit, has issued guidance called Applicant Beware to help job seekers recognize suspicious recruitment attempts.

In Britain, the alert follows an earlier MI5 warning in November 2025 to MPs, peers and parliamentary staff that Chinese intelligence officers were trying to recruit people with access to sensitive information about the British state. That warning named two LinkedIn profiles, Amanda Qiu and Shirly Shen, and described the outreach as being used at scale. Security Minister Dan Jarvis called that activity a “covert and calculated attempt” to interfere in the UK’s sovereign affairs.

The government has since said it will introduce a Counter Political Interference and Espionage Action Plan, with new guidance for political parties and candidates, closer work with professional networking sites and tighter rules on political donations. It also pledged £170 million to renew sovereign and encrypted technology for civil servants and another £130 million for counter-espionage, cyber and protective-security work, a sign that the threat has moved well beyond Parliament and into the wider professional marketplace.