Scotland and Wales show nationalism can be open and pluralistic

Scotland and Wales show nationalism can be open and pluralistic

Scotland and Wales have turned nationalism into an argument about belonging rather than borders. In both nations, the strongest versions of national politics have been tied to civic identity, social democracy, and self-government, not ethnic exclusion, and voters have repeatedly rewarded that approach at moments when constitutional politics mattered most.

The basic lesson is electoral, not abstract

The clearest proof came in Scotland’s independence referendum on September 18, 2014, when 3,623,344 votes were cast from 4,283,938 eligible voters and turnout reached 84.6 percent. The “No” side won 55.3 percent to 44.7 percent, but the campaign normalized a form of nationalism built around institutions, participation, and shared civic life rather than ethnic boundaries.

Wales took a different constitutional route, but the political logic was similar. On March 3, 2011, voters backed full law-making powers for the Welsh Assembly, now the Senedd, by 63.5 percent to 36.5 percent. That result followed earlier steps in 1997 and 2004 toward greater autonomy, helping establish that Welsh national identity could be expressed through devolved power instead of exclusionary statehood.

Scotland’s version of nationalism has been explicitly civic

In Scotland, the Scottish National Party has long framed nationalism in civic terms and paired that message with a more open stance on immigration. One of the clearest examples is the Scottish Government’s “New Scots” refugee integration strategy, first launched in 2014 with COSLA and the Scottish Refugee Council. That policy signaled that nation-building could mean inclusion, integration, and public responsibility.

NatCen Social Research has added empirical weight to that picture. It has found that supporters of Scottish independence are more likely than opponents to hold civic conceptions of national identity and more positive views toward immigration. Academic sources similarly describe the SNP as widely regarded as a civic-nationalist party, reinforcing the idea that Scottish nationalism has become less about bloodline and more about consent, institutions, and social membership.

That matters because it gives the Scottish case a political identity that is legible to voters who may reject exclusionary nationalism but still feel strongly about self-rule. The result is not a rejection of nationhood. It is a redefinition of it.

Wales has built a parallel, if distinct, model

Plaid Cymru has pursued a comparable course, though through Welsh language, culture, devolution, and civic self-determination rather than a direct mirror of the Scottish independence case. The party’s politics center on Wales-first governance and national confidence, but without recasting Welshness as an ethnic project.

That distinction is important. In Wales, nationalism has often worked best when it is tied to institutions and cultural preservation, especially the Welsh language, rather than to exclusionary ideas of who belongs. The result is a politics that can sound national in tone while remaining inclusive in practice.

The 2011 referendum was a turning point because it gave Welsh autonomy a democratic mandate with a clear majority. Once law-making powers were accepted as legitimate, nationalism in Wales became easier to express through constitutional and policy debates, not just protest. That has helped Plaid Cymru present itself as a party of national advancement without forcing voters into a zero-sum identity choice.

The 2024 general election showed where this model is still viable

The 2024 UK general election offered a fresh measure of how far civic nationalism can travel inside the electoral system. In Scotland, Labour won 37 of 57 seats and became the largest party there for the first time since 2010, taking 35.3 percent of the Scottish vote. The SNP fell to 9 seats, a dramatic reversal for a party that had long dominated the nationalist space.

In Wales, Labour won 27 of 32 seats, Plaid Cymru won 4, and the Liberal Democrats won 1. Plaid Cymru’s 14.8 percent vote share was its highest in a UK general election since it began contesting them in 1929, a sign that its message still resonates even when it does not dominate the map. The Conservatives were wiped out in Wales, losing all 13 seats they had held previously, underscoring how badly exclusionary or London-centered politics can fare in a devolved nation where constitutional identity carries real weight.

These results do not show that pluralistic nationalism has displaced Labour. They show something more subtle: civic nationalism remains electorally viable where it is anchored to devolution, national institutions, and a credible language of inclusion. In both Scotland and Wales, nationalism is not winning because it is loudest. It is competing because it has been normalized as a respectable democratic option.

Why the model works here, and where it may not travel

The Scottish and Welsh examples suggest that inclusive nationalism needs several conditions to succeed. First, it needs a constitutional framework that already recognizes the nation as a political unit, whether through devolved government, a referendum history, or a distinct legislature. Second, it needs nationalist parties that can connect identity to public goods, language policy, immigration, and governance rather than grievance alone.

Third, it needs a political culture in which anti-Brexit or pro-European sentiment, social democracy, and constitutional reform can reinforce one another. The notes from Scotland and Wales point in that direction: these devolved nations have repeatedly shown that nationalism can coexist with openness and reformist politics, even as harder-edged nationalism has gained ground elsewhere in the UK and across Europe.

That is why the model is not automatically exportable. In places where national identity is less tied to devolved institutions, or where nationalism has been defined more narrowly through ethnicity, border control, or centralized state power, civic nationalism has a harder time becoming electorally credible. The Scottish and Welsh cases are not a template to copy mechanically. They are evidence that nationalism can be made democratic, pluralistic, and governable when institutions reward that version of the story.

The broader lesson is that national identity does not have to be a closed category. In Scotland and Wales, voters have shown that it can be a framework for self-government, civic inclusion, and democratic legitimacy. That makes these cases less a curiosity than a warning to every politics built on exclusion: nationalism does not have to narrow the circle to be powerful.