Spain’s top court ends Pegasus probe, citing Israeli non-cooperation

Spain’s National High Court closed the criminal investigation into the alleged use of NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware against senior Spanish officials, concluding that repeated non-response by Israeli authorities made further progress impossible.

Investigating judge José Luis Calama said the inquiry could not advance because Israeli officials did not answer formal requests for cooperation. Court filings state investigators sent five such requests that went unanswered, leaving prosecutors without the information needed to identify suspects or pursue charges. Calama said the evidence gathered showed crimes that “jeopardized the security of the Spanish State,” and described Israel’s refusal to cooperate as a “manifest breach of its international obligations,” breaking “the balance inherent in international cooperation” and the “principle of good faith that should govern relations between states.”

The probe was opened in May 2022 after the Spanish government disclosed that Pegasus had been used to target members of the cabinet, a revelation that triggered a political crisis and led to the resignation of Spain’s intelligence chief. Court filings named Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and Defence Minister Margarita Robles among alleged targets, and indicated that phones belonging to the ministers of the interior and agriculture had also been affected. Court-related material and reporting allege Sánchez’s phone was infected five times.

Judge Calama had previously closed the case in 2023 for the same reason. He reopened the investigation in April 2024 after French authorities supplied new material from their 2021 Pegasus probe, which documented targeting of journalists, lawyers and political figures. That inflow of international evidence briefly renewed hopes of identifying those behind the intrusions. The latest closure on Jan. 22, 2026, represents a second judicial acknowledgement that the investigation’s success depended on cooperation from abroad that did not materialize.

Court documents presented a technical and legal portrait of a probe hamstrung by jurisdictional limits. Investigators focused on uncovering who ordered the alleged hacks rather than solely tracing the technical footprint of the spyware. But without responses to mutual legal assistance requests and without access to information that Israeli authorities or NSO Group might hold, Spanish prosecutors said they had no route to name or charge responsible parties.

NSO Group has denied wrongdoing in public statements, saying Pegasus is licensed to governments after Israeli government approval, is intended for use in fighting crime and protecting national security, and that the company lacks visibility into how customers employ the tool. Israeli officials, whose stated role is limited to issuing export licences for spyware, did not provide the cooperation Spain sought; court filings recorded the absence of answers to formal inquiries.

The closure leaves unanswered who ordered surveillance of Spain’s most senior officials and underscores a broader legal and diplomatic gap: domestic courts can document harm and technical intrusion, but accountability for intrusive, state-grade surveillance often hinges on cross-border cooperation that is not guaranteed. For Spanish prosecutors, the decision reiterated the limits of national remedies when evidence and potential suspects lie beyond national jurisdiction and the goodwill of other states.