Judge allows psychologist testimony in Bloomfield double homicide case

In a San Juan County courtroom on Jan. 14, 2026, defense attorney Marcus Cameron asked a judge to bar first-degree murder counts against Isaiah Brown on the ground that severe methamphetamine intoxication prevented the defendant from forming the specific intent required for first-degree murder. The motion targeted the intent element of the double-homicide prosecution stemming from an Aug. 28, 2024 incident in Bloomfield.

The judge denied a categorical exclusion of the first-degree counts but granted the defense the opportunity to present a forensic psychologist to testify about Brown’s mental state and capacity. By allowing expert testimony, the court signaled it will weigh scientific analysis of intoxication and mental functioning when resolving whether the prosecution can prove the heightened intent element for first-degree murder.

The case carries a broad slate of charges beyond the first-degree counts, and the judge’s ruling means the jury, or the court at pretrial stages, could see contested expert evidence on whether voluntary substance use can undercut specific intent. For San Juan County residents, the hearing represents a pivotal procedural moment: testimony accepted at this stage could narrow or preserve the most serious counts and shape possible pleas, sentencing exposure, and avenues for appeal.

The legal issue before the court touches on long-established distinctions in criminal law between general intent and specific intent offenses and the circumstances under which intoxication is relevant to culpability. For local institutions, the decision to admit forensic psychological analysis raises questions about access to experts, the role of mental health evaluations in serious felony prosecutions, and the resources required by both defense and prosecution to litigate technical forensic issues.

Beyond courtroom procedure, the motion has community implications. Families of the victims and Bloomfield residents seeking accountability will watch whether the factual record supports a finding of specific intent. At the same time, defense advocacy that invokes acute substance-induced incapacity highlights gaps in addiction treatment and mental health services that intersect with criminal justice outcomes in rural counties.

The court’s allowance of expert testimony does not decide the ultimate question of guilt or the sufficiency of intent; it determines only that the trier of fact will have psychiatric and psychological evidence to consider. The next steps will include presentation of the forensic psychologist’s analysis and further argument on how that evidence bears on the charged offenses.

For readers, the immediate takeaway is that a contested legal pathway remains open in the Bloomfield double-homicide prosecution. How the court evaluates expert testimony on intoxication and intent will shape the case’s trajectory and could influence local conversations about public safety, mental health services, and the resources counties need to handle complex criminal litigation.