Xi’s “great changes unseen in a century” signals China’s new strategy

A phrase that now functions like doctrine

“Great changes unseen in a century” is not just a line in Xi Jinping’s speeches. It has become a governing lens for how Beijing interprets the outside world and why China believes its moment has arrived. Analysts trace the Chinese phrase, “,” to a strategic reading of global instability, one that sees the United States as comparatively weaker, Western politics as more chaotic, and China as facing both danger and opportunity.

That matters because the phrase appears in major foreign-policy addresses, white papers and party documents, where it signals more than concern. It frames the international system as entering a new balance of power, one in which China expects to have greater room to shape outcomes rather than simply adapt to them.

How Beijing reads the world

Brookings has noted that Xi has used the phrase in critical foreign-policy speeches since 2017. In Chinese commentary, the term is linked to trade tensions, populism, securitization, technological change and the belief that the United States is in relative decline. CSIS translation work adds an important nuance: Chinese analysts describe these changes as profound transformation, not merely chaos.

That distinction is central. From Beijing’s perspective, the world is not simply breaking down. It is being rearranged. Official-language summaries describe a historical crossroads marked by trade frictions, anti-globalization sentiment, pandemics, recession and regional conflict. In that telling, China should respond by deepening ties with developing countries and taking a more active role in global governance institutions.

The phrase therefore serves as a shorthand for a policy agenda. It tells domestic and foreign audiences that China views uncertainty as a structural condition, not a temporary disruption, and that its response should be strategic, patient and expansive.

The historical echo Beijing wants readers to hear

The phrase also carries a deliberate historical resonance. Scholars often connect it to a similar formulation used in the Qing era by Li Hongzhang, who spoke of “great changes unseen in three thousand years” to describe national upheaval and humiliation. For modern Chinese nationalists, that parallel is powerful because it places today’s turbulence inside a longer story of weakness, resistance and recovery.

Rush Doshi draws on that comparison in *The Long Game*, where he argues that China’s grand strategy has moved through three stages since the end of the Cold War. The first was “hiding capabilities and biding time.” The second, after the 2008 global financial crisis, was “actively accomplishing something.” The third, he argues, began in 2017 with “great changes unseen in a century.”

That sequencing is important because it turns the phrase into more than rhetoric. In Doshi’s reading, it marks a shift from defensive patience to a more assertive effort to shape regional and global order.

Why 2016 changed the calculation

The timing matters. Doshi and others tie the shift to the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. election and the broader political turmoil in Western democracies. From Beijing’s vantage point, those developments reinforced a view that the liberal order was losing coherence while China’s own influence was rising.

That does not mean Chinese leaders see a simple collapse of the West. Rather, they appear to read a more competitive and fragmented environment in which U.S. leadership is less certain and global institutions may be more contestable. Xi’s language captures that judgment and gives it strategic force. It also offers a political logic for a more confident China that believes the balance of power is moving in its favor.

What the worldview means for trade, Taiwan and diplomacy

This outlook helps explain Beijing’s choices across several arenas.

On trade, a world of “great changes” justifies reduced dependence on vulnerable external links and a stronger push for resilience, especially where China sees U.S. pressure, supply-chain risk or technology restrictions. If the system is entering a new era of competition, then trade policy becomes inseparable from national security and industrial policy.

On Taiwan, the phrase reinforces Beijing’s conviction that time is not static. If the global order is shifting and China’s power is rising, then the political case for eventual unification can be framed as part of a broader historical correction. That does not remove risk; it heightens it. A strategy built around changing power balances tends to make Taiwan a central test of resolve.

On diplomacy, the logic points toward broader engagement with the developing world and more active participation in institutions where China can present itself as a defender of order, not a disruptor. Xi’s remarks in 2019 and later CCP documents placed global governance at the center of that message, suggesting that China wants to exploit instability by expanding its diplomatic reach.

Security and military posture under a changing balance of power

The phrase also shapes military thinking. If the world is in a period of geopolitical transition, then military modernization is not merely about defense; it is about ensuring China can operate decisively in a more contested environment. That helps explain why the phrase appears in discussions of security and development alongside foreign policy and global governance.

The strategic implication is clear: Beijing is preparing for a longer rivalry in which deterrence, signaling and capability development all matter. The language of “great changes unseen in a century” gives that posture an intellectual and political foundation. It suggests that China is not waiting for the world to stabilize around the old order. It is preparing for a new one.

The larger lesson of the phrase

Xi’s wording has become one of the clearest windows into how the Chinese leadership interprets the present moment. It combines historical grievance, strategic confidence and institutional ambition into a single frame. Through that lens, the United States looks less dominant, the West looks more divided, and China looks more prepared to claim a larger role in shaping rules, institutions and outcomes.

That is why the phrase matters. It is not a slogan floating above policy. It is a map for how Beijing is likely to approach trade coercion, Taiwan pressure, diplomatic outreach and military modernization in the years ahead.