Chinese Cyberattacks Flood Taiwan Infrastructure at 2.63 Million Daily

Taiwan’s National Security Bureau released an analysis in early January 2026 finding that Chinese cyberattacks against the island’s critical infrastructure averaged 2.63 million intrusion attempts per day in 2025. That figure represented a 6 percent rise from 2024 and a 113 percent increase from 2023, the first year the bureau began publishing daily-attempt totals. The report, titled "Analysis on China's Cyber Threats to Taiwan's Critical Infrastructure in 2025," maps a persistent and expanding campaign across civic and economic lifelines.

The NSB said intrusion attempts struck nine primary sectors, including government administration, energy and communications, transportation, emergency rescue and hospitals, water resources, finance, science parks, industrial parks and food systems. Energy grids and hospitals experienced the most significant year-on-year surges, the bureau noted, raising immediate concerns about public safety and continuity of essential services. Science parks that host advanced semiconductor firms such as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company were singled out as prime targets for technology theft and intellectual property compromise.

Observed tactics in 2025 ranged from distributed denial-of-service attacks designed to disrupt daily life to man-in-the-middle operations that intercept communications and infiltrate telecommunications networks. The NSB described episodes of synchronization between cyber offensives and Chinese military drills, framing those operations as part of "hybrid threats" intended to paralyze the island. Attack volumes spiked around the first anniversary of President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration in May 2025 and surged again during Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim’s trip to Europe in November 2025, patterns the bureau flagged as potentially deliberate.

The NSB assessed the pattern as calculated. The report stated that the trend "indicates a deliberate attempt by China to compromise Taiwan’s crucial infrastructure comprehensively and to disrupt or paralyze Taiwanese government and social functions." The bureau did not publish data on how many of the intrusion attempts succeeded, nor did it name individual attacker groups; public summaries focused on counts of attempts and broad attribution to Chinese threat actors without forensic detail.

The scale and character of the campaign carry wider geopolitical and economic implications. Taiwan’s semiconductor sector is a linchpin of global technology supply chains, and sustained pressure on science parks and industrial networks threatens downstream manufacturers worldwide. Attacks on hospitals and energy systems also raise acute humanitarian concerns; disruptions of that sort intersect with international legal debates about state responsibility and the protection of civilian infrastructure in cyberspace.

For Taipei, the NSB findings sharpen the diplomatic challenge of seeking deterrence and accountability without escalating military confrontation. For regional partners and multinational corporations, the report underscores the imperative of deepening cyber resilience, information-sharing and joint contingency planning. As cyber operations increasingly accompany conventional military posturing, governments and private operators must weigh technical defenses alongside legal and diplomatic tools to manage a campaign that blends espionage, coercion and potential disruption to civilian life.