Congress Weighs Limits on Presidential Tariff Powers Amid Trade Turmoil

Congress’s tariff fight is really a fight over constitutional control

The clash now unfolding in Washington is not just about tariffs. It is about who gets to decide when trade policy becomes an emergency tool, and how long a president can keep using that power before Congress steps back in.

The Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate foreign commerce, impose tariffs, and collect revenue, but lawmakers have spent decades delegating pieces of that authority to the executive branch. Those delegations, through laws including Section 232, Section 122, Sections 201 and 301, and Section 338, have given presidents room to move quickly on trade. The current fight reflects growing unease that emergency powers are now being stretched into a standing trade weapon, with consequences that can hit import costs, supply chains, and consumer budgets within hours.

The Supreme Court ruling changed the legal ground under the dispute

The legal landscape shifted sharply when the Supreme Court ruled on February 20, 2026, in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, that IEEPA does not authorize presidential tariffs. The Congressional Research Service says that until 2025, no president had used IEEPA as the legal basis for imposing tariffs, which makes the ruling a major limit on how far emergency economic authority can reach.

The administration responded by turning to Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 and imposing a temporary 10% import surcharge on February 20, 2026. Customs guidance says that duty can last for up to 150 days unless Congress extends it, and CRS notes that Section 122 was designed for fundamental international payments problems, not as a general-purpose tariff authority. That matters because it shows how quickly a blocked tariff strategy can be replaced with another one, keeping the broader legal fight alive even after one court decision.

The Trade Review Act would force Congress back into the process

The strongest bipartisan effort to rein in presidential tariff power is the Trade Review Act of 2025. Senators Maria Cantwell and Chuck Grassley introduced the bill on April 3, 2025, and the Senate version, S.1272, has a House companion, H.R. 2665. The measure is modeled after the War Powers Resolution of 1973, a clear sign that supporters want to treat tariff power as an area where emergency action should not become unchecked executive habit.

Under the bill, the president would have to notify Congress within 48 hours of imposing or increasing a tariff, explain the rationale and the expected impact on businesses and consumers, and then win congressional approval within 60 days or let the tariff expire. Congress could also end tariffs earlier through a joint resolution of disapproval. The Senate version excludes anti-dumping and countervailing duties, which keeps the legislation focused on broad tariff actions rather than existing trade remedies.

Cantwell has said the point is to restore rules-based trade policy and stop arbitrary tariffs, especially on allies, from raising prices for American consumers and businesses. Grassley has argued that Congress has delegated too much of its foreign-commerce authority to the executive branch. Amy Klobuchar’s office said the bill was a response to erratic tariff announcements that made it difficult for families and businesses to plan.

The bill’s reach is broader than the names on the front page. The Senate release said it was cosponsored by Jerry Moran, Lisa Murkowski, Mark Warner, Mitch McConnell, Michael Bennet, Thom Tillis and Peter Welch, showing that concern over tariff authority cuts across party lines and regions.

Why businesses, farmers, and lawmakers are uneasy

The White House has defended its tariff actions by arguing that the bill would severely restrict the president’s ability to respond to national emergencies and foreign threats. That defense captures the central tension in the debate. Supporters of strong presidential authority say trade policy has to move fast when foreign coercion, unfair trade practices, or security threats emerge. Critics counter that speed is exactly why Congress needs a stronger hand, because tariffs can change market behavior long before lawmakers have time to react.

Business groups have made the predictability argument with unusual force. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce later backed Cantwell’s tariff-restriction effort, and the Retail Industry Leaders Association said retailers need certainty and predictability to plan investments and support jobs. Import-heavy industries and companies that rely on long supply chains see tariff swings as a direct threat to contracting, inventory management, and pricing decisions.

Farm-state lawmakers and agricultural exporters have been especially alarmed. CNBC reported on April 28, 2025, that U.S. farm exporters described retaliation from the tariff fight as a “full-blown crisis already,” while other reporting noted that farmers feared second-term tariffs could be even worse than the 2018 trade war because of high input costs and borrowing rates. That fear is not abstract. Agriculture absorbed large bailout costs in the first Trump trade war, and new retaliation can quickly hit rural communities, equipment dealers, processors, and the local businesses tied to farm income.

The economic numbers help explain the urgency

The cost of tariff turbulence is no longer theoretical. The Budget Lab at Yale estimated that tariff revenue was $214.7 billion above the 2022-2024 average as of February 2026. It also said the effective tariff rate reached 10.6% in January 2026, while imported PCE core goods and durable goods prices each rose 1.5% through January 2026.

Yale’s estimate that roughly $165 billion in unlawfully collected duties may be refunded to importers after the Supreme Court decision adds another layer of disruption. Refunds can help affected companies, but they also underline how much capital has already been tied up by the fight. For businesses, that means more paperwork, more uncertainty, and more pressure at a time when many are already dealing with inflation pressures and volatile demand.

The broader market reaction has been just as stark. A Council on Foreign Relations review published on the one-year anniversary of the April 2, 2025 tariffs said the effective tariff rate had at one point reached 22.5% and that markets sold off sharply after the announcement. Those numbers show why lawmakers describe tariff authority as a power that can move billions of dollars and alter prices long before courts or Congress finish their work.

The next court fight could define the balance of power

Congressional Research Service says recent presidents have used Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs and Section 301 tariffs on Chinese imports, but not before 2025 had any president used IEEPA to impose tariffs. That history gives the current dispute its force. It is not only about one tariff, one president, or one round of retaliation against China, Canada, or Mexico. It is about whether Congress can still set clear boundaries around emergency economic governance after years of broad executive action.

If the Trade Review Act or a similar measure advances, the legal fight could turn into a referendum on how much deference judges should give presidents in economic emergencies and whether trade statutes have been stretched beyond their intended purpose. The result will shape more than trade headlines. It will affect consumer prices, business planning, and the basic balance of power between Congress and the White House long after the current turmoil fades.