Jamaat-e-Islami rebrands and mobilizes ahead of pivotal Feb. 12 vote

Jamaat-e-Islami, long ostracized for its opposition to Bangladesh’s 1971 independence and sidelined from electoral politics for more than a decade, has embarked on a visible rebranding and mobilisation campaign as the country heads into parliamentary elections on Feb. 12, 2026. The party’s rapid public resurfacing follows the mass uprising that ended the Awami League’s rule on Aug. 5, 2024 and a period of intense political realignment since.

Party officials have signalled ambitious electoral plans, saying they will field candidates in all 300 parliamentary constituencies. Organisers report that internal divisions with other Islamist groups have been papered over and that the party will present an all-male slate, a decision that local reporting links to an electoral pact with the National Citizen Party, a new formation led by student figures from the 2024 uprising. That alignment provoked some prospective female candidates to withdraw, underscoring tensions between the party’s drive for broad appeal and its conservative organisational choices.

The rebranding effort has been deliberate and multimedia. Jamaat has adopted a new, less overtly Islamist logo, stepped up its social media presence to court younger voters, and begun to frame policy positions in terms that observers describe as more liberal or progressive. Analysts say the strategy appears designed to make the party more palatable to a post-Hasina electorate and to international observers scrutinising Bangladesh’s return to competitive politics.

The party has also leaned into its traditional organisational strengths by mobilising student cadres. At a Khulna Metropolitan branch reunion of Bangladesh Islami Chhatrashibir that brought together alumni from 1977 to 2025, Jamaat Secretary General Mia Golam Parwar urged renewed activism, saying “now is the best time to send ‘Deen,’ or the righteous and pious, to the Parliament.” Those appeals aim to convert a disciplined activist base into electoral machines at a moment when digital outreach and campus networks could prove decisive.

Jamaat’s alliance with the National Citizen Party situates it within a broader debate over institutional reform. The July Charter, a reform roadmap signed in October by 25 parties, including Jamaat and the BNP, is slated for a February referendum that will run alongside or immediately follow the parliamentary contest. The Charter proposes sweeping changes such as a bicameral legislature, prime ministerial term limits, proportional representation, and formal recognition of the 2024 uprising. Jamaat appears to be positioning itself to influence the interim authorities’ reform agenda and to press for a role in any proportional representation architecture.

Skepticism persists, rooted in the party’s wartime-era baggage and the hardline response during the Hasina years. Several top Islamist leaders were tried, sentenced to death and executed for war crimes under the previous government, and critics point to organisational continuity and reported ideological links to transnational Islamist movements as reasons for concern. The central unknown is whether Jamaat’s moderation is substantive or tactical: whether its new messaging and youth-focused digital push will translate into votes, whether its alliance with inexperienced centrist forces will broaden its appeal, and whether reputational and legal constraints will limit its resurgence.

The Feb. 12 elections and the February referendum on the July Charter will be the first full tests of Jamaat’s reinvention, and of Bangladesh’s ability to absorb a resurgent Islamist actor within a reimagined political order.