Mindfulness theories should allow some disapproval, philosopher argues

The cleanest version of mindfulness, Logan Mitchell argues, may be too clean. In a paper titled Mindfulness, disapproval, and morality, Mitchell says secular mindfulness theories should make room for at least some disapproving attitudes inside a mindful state, especially when the situation calls for moral judgment rather than passive observation.

The article appears in Philosophical Psychology 39(3): 1-23 (2026), and an archive version lists the DOI 10.1080/09515089.2026.2654008. Mitchell, a PhD candidate in philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, is not arguing from the outside. Mitchell is also a certified mindfulness instructor and an ordained member of the Plum Village lineage of Buddhism founded by Thich Nhat Hanh, which gives the paper a rare mix of academic philosophy and lived practice.

The target of the argument is familiar to anyone who has spent time around modern mindfulness programs. In psychology and health settings, mindfulness is commonly defined as awareness of internal states and surroundings, paired with an accepting or nonjudgmental attitude. The American Psychological Association describes it that way, and that definition has shaped everything from therapy rooms to app prompts. Mitchell’s point is that this framing can go too far if it implies that a mindful person should never disapprove, never judge harm, and never feel morally charged anger.

That matters because the mainstream story of mindfulness is no longer a niche one. Jon Kabat-Zinn developed Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction in 1979 at the University of Massachusetts Medical School, and UMass Memorial Health says hundreds of thousands of people worldwide have completed the original 8-week program. The National Center for Complementary and Integrative Health says U.S. adult meditation use more than doubled from 7.5% in 2002 to 17.3% in 2022, which means the philosophy behind mindfulness now shapes a huge public audience, not just a circle of meditators.

Mitchell’s argument lands in that larger world with a practical edge. The paper points to anger at injustice as one example of a disapproving attitude that can matter morally and still fit a disciplined, reflective practice. That is a direct challenge to the version of mindfulness that treats every negative judgment as a failure of awareness. If mindfulness is meant to be widely recommended as a way of life, Mitchell writes, secular theories have to explain how people can stay present without becoming morally anesthetized.

That is also where the safety debate becomes harder to ignore. NCCIH cites a 2020 review of 83 studies with 6,703 participants, and 55 of those studies reported negative experiences tied to meditation practices. Mitchell’s paper presses the same basic question from a different angle: a practice that cannot register harm, disapproval, or ethical urgency may be calm, but it is not obviously ready for real life.